All posts by k1775036

Internship Opportunity

Project Alpha works to understand and counter procurement of technologies with a use in UN-restricted nuclear and missile programmes, as pursued by Iran, North Korea, and others. The Project has numerous strands that contribute to this objective, including educating industry on export controls and proliferation risks, researching the techniques used by proliferators to acquire goods illicitly, and conducting international outreach to improve the implementation of trade controls in third countries. Alpha also actively supports the work of UN organisations, the IAEA, and national governments.

The Alpha team are looking for one or more interns to work with the project for the next three to six months. The focus of the internship will be split between analytical research and administrative support to the team. Interns may also have the opportunity to conduct and publish research on issues related to non-proliferation and sanctions. Duties are as follows:

  • To conduct open source research under the direction of the project staff into illicit WMD procurement
  • To assist the project staff in maintaining the project’s online platform
  • To assist Alpha’s staff in the preparation of articles and other briefing material on proliferation-related procurement by conducting open source research and analysis
  • To work closely with Alpha staff in the preparation and running of a series of workshops

Candidates should be able to commit to working in the office for at least two half days per week, should have excellent analytical and organisational skills (with experience of event organisation and management), and should have impeccable writing skills. Additional language skills and knowledge of open source analytical trade-craft are a plus.

Interested parties should send CVs and cover letters to Emma Scott (emma.l.scott@kcl.ac.uk)

Latest Report of the UN Secretary General on Security Council Resolution 2231: Its nuclear- and ballistic missile-related provisions

On 12 June 2018 and following the United States withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Nuclear Deal) on 8 May 2018, the UN Secretary General released his fifth report on the implementation of Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). The UN Secretary General is required to report to the Security Council on the implementation of the resolution every six months. Therefore, this 5th report provides an assessment on the implementation of the resolution since the issuance of the 4th report on 8 December 2017.

 

Key Findings included:

  • 13 new proposals submitted through the Procurement Channel bringing the total number of submissions to 37
  • 6 cases of illicit procurement activity, which would have required advanced approval by the UN Security Council
  • Component parts of missile launches fired by the Houthis at Saudi territory were manufactured in Iran, and features of the missiles were consistent with the Qiam-1

 

Usage of the Procurement Channel

There were 13 proposals submitted through the Procurement Channel to participate in or permit activities with Iran for nuclear or non-nuclear civilian end uses. This figure is up from 8 proposals submitted in the previous reporting period and brings the total number of proposals submitted since Implementation Day (16 January 2016) to 37. Of these 37, 24 proposals have been approved by the Council, 3 have been disapproved, 7 have been withdrawn by the proposing state, and 3 are currently under review.

While more frequently used than in the first year, the number of submissions demonstrates that activity in the procurement channel remains quite low in comparison to expectations, and this is partly due to a lack of awareness by sellers, and in some cases national authorities of its existence.[1]

 

Procurement of Nuclear-related Dual Use Items

Information was submitted from 2 member states (the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the United States of America about attempts by Iran to procure apparently-controlled dual-use items outside of the authorised channels Notably four shipments were seized by the UAE while in transit to Iran. The items involved 40 cylindrical segments of tungsten, 1 inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometer, 10 capacitors, and 1 titanium rod. As these materials are control list items governed by the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines of Nuclear Related Dual-Use Equipment, they would have required advanced approval by the Security Council in line with the provisions of paragraph 2 of Annex B of resolution 2231 (2015).

U.S. authorities informed the Secretariat that two commodities – carbon fibre and aluminium alloys again governed by the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines of Nuclear Related Dual-Use Equipment had been transferred to Iran over the last year without prior approval of the Security Council as would have been required for such items.

Iran responded to the accusation by stating that it was the responsibility of the exporting state to seek approval through the procurement channel. While this is true, the response negates the fact that Iran is required to issue end user certificates for all such items before they are imported to the country so that the Iranian government cannot claim that it was not aware of the imports. As such, the statements in the UNSGs report assert that Iran has violated UNSCR2231 and the JCPOA, albeit in a relatively narrow and technical way.

 

Ballistic Missile related transfers

In examining 5 of 11 ballistic missile launches (22 July and 4 November 2017, and 19 December 2017 and 5 and 30 January 2018) by Yemen’s Houthi rebels at Saudi territory, the Secretariat found that some component parts in the debris of launches had been manufactured in Iran. Specifically, the Secretariat found that the features of the 5 missiles examined are consistent with those of the Iranian Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missile.

This latter finding supports that of the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen in January 2018, which reported that the Borkan-2H short-range ballistic missile fired at King Khaled International Airport in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in November 2017 “was a derived lighter version, designed specifically by the manufacturers of the Qiam-1” missile.

The Secretariat further assessed that the logo on the jet vane actuators matches that of the Iranian entity Shahid Bagheri Industries (S.B.I.), an Iranian entity linked to composite rocket fuel and missile technology.[2] The Secretariat also observed that a printed circuit board was marked with SHIG 6081, where SHIG is an abbreviation for the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, reportedly responsible for Iran’s liquid fuelled ballistic missiles.

 

To read the full report, please click here. The next report of the Secretary General will be issued in December 2018.

[1] Paulina Izewicz, Assessing the JCPOA Procurement Channel, The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 29 March 2018, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2018/03/jcpoa-procurement-channel

[2] Iran Watch, Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group, last modified 1 January 2009, https://www.iranwatch.org/iranian-entities/shahid-bagheri-industrial-group

Can Europe save the JCPOA?

Ian J Stewart, Director of Project Alpha

Click here to access the full article: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

On May 8, President Trump “withdrew” the United States from a deal agreed by his predecessor to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. US withdrawal was not foreseen when the agreement was drafted, nor was the possibility that the United States might stand in isolation from its closest international partners. Withdrawal also did not mean that the deal ended, but US actions have caused a crisis and could well result in the deal coming to an end. Some have argued that the European states might be able to save the JCPOA. It is important for them to bolster the agreement to the extent that they can, even if the tools available to salvage it are limited.

There appears to be three broad scenarios for what might happen next. The first is that Iran decides to stay in the JCPOA. The immediate response of Iranian officials has been to say that the country will remain in the agreement if the Europeans—and the other parties—can assure Iran receives the benefits it expected when the deal was concluded. A second foreseeable scenario would have Iran withdraw from the JCPOA and resume its nuclear program. There are a couple of different ways this could happen. The third path forward could see the US trigger a snapback of UN sanctions. The re-imposition of UN sanctions would put the EU in the impossible situation of having to decide between complying with the UN Charter or complying with a legally non-binding nuclear agreement with Iran. Ultimately, it will be for Iran to decide whether to continue with the JCPOA or to terminate the agreement.

Preventing the Proliferation of WMDs: Measuring the Success of UN Security Council Resolution 1540

Editors: Daniel Salisbury, Ian J. Stewart, Andrea Viski

Click here to access the book_Preventing the Proliferation of WMDs: Measuring the Success of UN Security Council Resolution 1540

 

This edited volume provides a fresh analysis for researcher and practitioners regarding United Nations Security Council resolution 1540, the status of its implementation, and its future by providing an original evaluation of progress in implementation and challenges faced during the resolution’s first decade. In doing so, the book will consider the resolution’s utility as a non-proliferation tool with a view to identifying what further actions are required for the objectives and goals embodied by UNSCR 1540 to be achieved and sustained.  The book progresses by exploring the history of the resolution, implementation trends, implementation from a regional perspective, challenges, and future ways forward. The book appeals to a wide readership of scholars, policymakers, and other stakeholders of the 1540 process.

Non-Proliferation and Foreign Direct Investment Reviews: Implications for Reform in the UK

Felix Ruechardt, Researcher (felix.ruechardt@kcl.ac.uk)

Click here to access the report: Foreign Investment Reviews and Non-Proliferation: Implications for Reform in the UK

In October 2017, the UK government published a Green Paper entitled “National Security and Infrastructure Investment Review” which outlined short-term and long-term proposals to reform the nation’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) review system. It currently rests on limited powers granted to the government in the Enterprise Act of 2002. By expanding the scope of its FDI review system, the government seeks to counter increased foreign (especially Chinese) investments into UK infrastructure and critical technology sectors.

However, the Green Paper does not address the role that an FDI review on national security grounds will take in enhancing the export control and non-proliferation regimes of the United Kingdom. While not dismissing the valid and important security concerns regarding critical infrastructure and critical technology sectors, this report emphasises the importance of including non-proliferation as a key function of a reformed FDI review system in the UK.

Using strategic FDI transactions has in the past been a successful stratagem by proliferation actors in the cases of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programme of Iraq and the alleged WMD programme of Iran. This is demonstrated by three case studies in this report in which proliferation actors circumvented export control and non-proliferation rules by purchasing Western companies holding technologies of proliferation concern: Matrix Churchill (UK) and H+H Metalform (GER), two companies that were purchased by an Iraqi proliferation network in the 1980s, and MCS Technologies (GER), a company secretly bought by Iran in 2003. The UK government should use its current reform efforts to close this gap that remains an issue today.

FDI review systems that have non-proliferation as one of their functions are able to address this evasion strategy. Two allies of the United Kingdom, the United States and Germany, have successfully demonstrated this in their FDI review procedures. Both countries tie the powers to scrutinize FDI transactions and potentially block them to whether businesses manufacture goods or hold technologies that are subject to export control rules. In Germany, a stricter reviewing procedure and a mandatory notification regime even apply in these cases – something that is debated in the United States currently as well.

The UK government can learn from the abovementioned cases of FDI as a proliferation strategy as well as the systems the United States and Germany have put in place to counter said strategy. This report calls for it to:

  • Make non-proliferation a clearly stated function of the reformed FDI review system while not dismissing other key functions such as protecting critical infrastructure;
  • Base a mandatory notification regime for mergers and tightened rules on the Strategic Export Control Lists and companies who manufacture goods on those;
  • Refrain from excluding smaller companies from falling under the scope of an FDI review system as those companies are also increasingly holding proliferation-relevant technologies.

The direction of the reform process will to a certain extent of course depend on the outcome of the negotiations the UK government is currently holding with the other EU member states over their relationship after the UK leaves the EU bloc. But if the UK government strengthens the non-proliferation component of its FDI review reform proposals, those will set it on track to establish a system that is comparable to those in other countries that have national security based FDI reviews in place to date.